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Abstract. This paper reviews the arguments for and the implications of employing Declining 
Discount Rates (DDRs) in CBA and in the analysis of economic growth and sustainability. 
We show that there exist several growth models in which a relationship has been found 
between the long-run equilibrium under DDRs and that in which a zero discount rate is 
employed. This can have the effect of pushing the optimum under DDRs away from the 
conventional utilitarian outcome towards the Green Golden Rule (GGR) level of capita or 
environmental stocks. Furthermore, in response to worries that the GGR places weight on the 
future at too great an expense to the present, we highlight the result of Li and Lofgren (2000):  
DDRs can evoke a solution to resource management problems in which the objective function 
explicitly takes into account the preferences of present and future generations, such as those 
posited by. Either zero or conventional discounting does not achieve this solution. It is in 
these senses that DDRs can be seen to encourage a more equal treatment of generations and 
promote sustainable outcomes. We also discuss different methodologies for the estimation of 
a working schedule of DDRs assuming that future discount rates and the past provides 
information about the future. The policy implications of this are that a correctly specified 
model of discount rates provides a schedule of DDRs, which values atmospheric carbon 
reduction 150% higher than conventional exponential discounting, and almost 90% higher 
than incorrectly specified models. In this sense sustainable outcomes are more likely to 
emerge from project appraisal with DDRs, but given that the theory of DDRs for CBA 
reviewed relates to the socially efficient discount rate, such outcomes can also be thought of 
as efficient. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Discounting is an issue that continues to receive much attention in the analysis of economic 
growth and sustainability, Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and in the study if micro-economic 
behaviour. With the advent of a distinct long-term policy arena however, in which long-term 
decisions must be made concerning various environmental, natural resources and other issues, 
such as climate change, biodiversity loss and nuclear build, attention has necessarily turned 
towards alternative methods of determining inter-temporal values than exponential 
discounting. In particular, the use of discount rates that decline with the time horizon, 
Declining Discount Rates (DDRs) has received much attention as a useful alternative and the 
reasons for this attention are numerous.  
 
Firstly, the use of conventional constant exponential discounting over long-time horizons 
ensures that the welfare of generations in the distant future is discounted back to peanuts.  As 
Weitzman (1998) states, ‘to think about the distant future in terms of standard discounting is 
to have an uneasy intuitive feeling that something is wrong, somewhere’. Chichilnisky (1996) 
referred to this as the ‘tyranny’ of exponential discounting, in that it makes the current 
generation a dictator over future generations. Such unequal treatment of generations caused 
Ramsey (1928) to label discounting of future utilities as ‘ethically indefensible’. Secondly, 
not only does this trouble our intuition and sense of fairness, it is also clearly contrary to the 
widely supported goal of sustainable development. Sustainable development requires that 
policies and investments now have due regard for the need to secure sustained increases in per 
capital welfare over longer time horizons than might normally be considered in policy-
making (Atkinson et al. 1997). In this regard, the use of DDRs has been found to offer 
solutions to resource management problems that adhere to desirable axioms of 
intergenerational choice, such that neither the present nor the future generation holds a 
dictatorship over the other in determining optimal management. That is, in many cases DDRs 
can ensure intergenerational equity and sustainability.  Lastly, there is a wide body of 
experimental and empirical evidence associated with the ‘hyperbolic’ discounting literature 
(for example Lowenstein and Elster 1992, Frederick, Lowenstein and O’Donoghue 2002) 
suggesting that individuals actually employ discount rates that decline over time in evaluating 
projects or scenarios. For this reason it seems sensible to incorporate such preferences into 
CBA and the analysis of economic growth and sustainability.  
 
So, on the one hand the use of DDRs is often seen as a resolution of what Pigou called the 
‘defective telescopic faculty’ of conventional exponential discounting (Pigou 1932) in that 
greater weight is placed upon the consequences of projects that occur in the far distant future 
and the preferences of future generations are more clearly registered. On the other hand, it 
appears on occasion to reflect how people actually behave. However, despite these arguments 
questions remain for the practitioner of CBA: what formal justifications exist for using a 
DDR in CBA?  And, if we accept the theoretical arguments for DDRs, what is the optimal 
trajectory of the decline? In this paper we discuss the implications of DDRs for sustainability 
and intergenerational equity and review the various arguments for the use of DDRs in CBA.  
 
 
2. A Review of Discount Rates 
 
Project Appraisal or Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the Net Present Value (NPV) criterion 
with which it is associated is rooted in the tradition of discounted utilitarianism. The 
utilitarian objective is to maximise the sum of net welfare changes for generations within the 
prescribed time horizon. CBA can be thought of as consisting of two stages in determining 
the NPV. Firstly the impacts and the costs and benefits of particular projects or policy 
interventions must be assessed in terms of their incidence in time and their economic value. 
Secondly, a judgement must be made concerning the relative value of costs and benefits that 
accrue in different time periods, i.e. a discount function needs to be selected. The discount 
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function employed reflects the manner in which the numeraire changes in value depending 
upon its incidence in time and hence the discount rate will usually depend upon the 
numeraire. However whatever the numeraire a decision must also be made concerning the 
behaviour of the discount rate over time. Koopmans (1960), for example, provides an 
axiomatic approach to the selection of the discount function which provides a rationale for 
conventional constant rate exponential discounting. Following the tradition of e.g. Little and 
Mirlees (1974) and Lind (1982) it is usual in CBA to evaluate all costs and benefits using 
consumption as the numeraire and employing exponential discounting. In this sense the NPV 
of a public project with time horizon T can be evaluated as follows: 
 
(1)   ( ) ( )∫ −−T tt dtatcb0 exp
 
where  and  represent the costs and benefits at time t and a represents the chosen social 
discount rate (SDR). Where consumption is the numeraire the social rate of discount is 
commonly called the consumption rate of interest/discount or the social rate of time 
preference. We denote this by 
tb tc
δ . This discount rate reflects how the contribution of 
increments of consumption to the underlying utilitarian welfare function changes over time. It 
also reflects the economic arguments for discounting in CBA. 
 
Firstly individuals discount consumption in the future because they are impatient. This is 
reflected by pure rate of time preference or utility discount rate, ρ 1. Secondly, utility 
maximising individuals discount the future in accordance with how they expect their wealth 
to change in the future. There are two important effects here, the wealth effect and the 
prudence effect (see for example, Gollier 2002a). Put simply, if individuals expect their 
wealth to increase in the future they value current consumption more highly and as a result 
discount the future more heavily. Inversely, if individuals are ‘prudent’, i.e. they increase 
savings in response to greater uncertainty about future consumption, then they will value 
consumption in the future more, and hence discount the future at a lower rate2. These effects 
and the consumption decisions of utility maximising individuals are commonly represented 
by the Ramsey equation (Ramsey 1928): 
 
(2) gr μρδ +==    
   
where r  is the risk free rate of return o marginal opportunity cost of capital, here μ  
represents the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, a measure of the curvature of the 
utility function and hence the desire to smooth consumption over time, and g represents the 
growth rate of consumption3.  Equation (2) shows, with reasonable assumptions concerning 
preferences ( 0>μ ), positive growth will increase δ 4. The equivalent of (2) when growth is 
uncertain is (Gollier 2002a): 
 
(3) [ ] ( ) (CPggEr tt 11 ~var2~ ++ −+≈= )
μμρδ      
 
where  is a measure of individual's relative prudence as a function of consumption C, ( )CP
]1[~ +tgE  is today’s expectation of growth in period 1+t  and ( )1~var +tg  is the variance. 
Kimball (1990) shows that if individuals are prudent then ( ) >C 0P  and hence the associated 
value of δ  decreases with variance5. Equation (3) shows that the overall effect on δ  depends 
upon the balance between the prudence effect (the third element) and the wealth effect (the 
second element). Under uncertainty the term μ  represents another element of individuals’ 
preferences for risk: it is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and together with the 
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measure of prudence , equation (3) shows how the discount rate is dependent upon such 
preferences.  
( )CP
 
δIn a competitive economy  will be equal to the social (risk free) rate of return on capital, r, 
which, in the absence of distortions such as taxes and externalities, will equal the private rate 
of return on capital, i. However, under the (realistic) assumption imperfect markets these rates 
are unlikely to be equal and thus the appropriate discount rate is not immediately obvious. 
(Lind, 1982). For this reason economists and others have argued over which of these several 
discount rates should be used as the SDR, r, i, or δ . In a competitive economy these rates are 
equal, reflecting the interaction of utility maximising consumption decisions and profit 
maximising production decisions. Nevertheless, a consensus in recent literature appears to 
have been reached that the SDR should equal the opportunity cost of capital, r (Portney and 
Weyant 1999). 
 
A number of additional arguments have been posited for once and for all adjustments to the 
level of the discount rate in particular circumstances. For example, Krutilla and Fisher (1975) 
suggested that the discount rate should be reduced for projects that have a significant 
environmental component since if environmental goods are increasing in scarcity and 
incomes are growing, future generations will harbour a greater willingness to pay for such 
goods. Gravelle and Rees (2000) used a similar argument for the case of health benefits. Such 
an approach implies a composite discount rate for the evaluation of these particular benefits 
and costs, which is reduced by the inclusion of the growth rate of willingness to pay6. 
However, Horowitz (2002) rightly highlights the importance of separating out 
contemporaneous and intertemporal valuation issues from the discounting issues. Weitzman 
(1994) also called for a reduction in the level of the discount rate applied for CBA in order to 
account for the increased diversion of consumption required in order to meet environmental 
standards in the face of greater output. He showed that consumption externalities lead to such 
'environmental drag' and can cause a divergence between the social and private rates of return 
to capital, particularly where environmental damage is not easily reversed. A number of other 
arguments exist for this once and for all reduction in the level of the discount rate7. 
 
In the analysis of economic growth and sustainability the tradition of discounted utilitarianism 
has also received much attention. The objective function in such models is frequently 
concerned with the maximisation of welfare over time by a representative social planner, i.e. 
it is utility rather than consumption that is the important value. The objective function in such 
cases is commonly: 
 
(4)  { } ( )∫ −= TC dttWt 0 expmax ρ( )tCu
 
subject to the constraints of the particular model in hand, where ( )tC  ru epresents the utility at 
time t. The appropriate discount rate in this case, and for all cases where utility is the 
numeraire, is the utility discount rate ρ .  
 
Clearly, there is a correspondence between the two discount rates described thus far: ρ  and 
δ , and both of these concepts arise in the discounted utilitarian framework, respectively for 
valuing changes in utility and consumption that occur at different points in time. However, 
the correspondence between the two will depend upon the assumptions contained in the 
underlying welfare function. For example, Equation (2) reflects the assumptions contained in 
the Ramsey model, that is that utility depends solely on consumption. The two rates will 
differ in general and we should be aware that it is quite possible to have positive discounting 
of consumption and zero discounting of utility, or vice versa, occurring simultaneously8. 
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Economic growth theorists differ in their opinions with regard to the discounting of utility in 
this way. For example, Chichilnisky (1996) framed the discussion in the language of social 
choice in her analysis of sustainable growth by noting that the utilitarian objective function 
for which 0>ρ  places an effective dictatorship of the present over the future: positive 
discounting reduces to zero the importance of future generation’s welfare in the calculus of 
economic growth. Indeed, due to this unequal treatment of generations many of the early 
growth theorists were strongly opposed to discounting utility. For example, Ramsey (1928) 
stated that such a practice is 'ethically indefensible' while Harrod (1948) stated that it 
represented a 'triumph of reason over passion'.  As a result there are many examples of growth 
models in which the objective function in Equation (4) has been evaluated using a zero utility 
discount rate.  
 
The implications of using zero discount rates are numerous and of great interest in the 
analysis of growth and sustainability starting with the analysis of Ramsey (1928) and 
culminating more recently with the analysis of, among others, Li and Löfgren (2001). Of 
particular importance is the analysis of alternative growth paths or interventions in which 
benefits or costs occur over an infinite horizon since when the welfare effects are positive 
over such a horizon the integral in (4) is unbounded, making comparisons between different 
alternatives on this basis impossible. This is coupled with problems in the analysis of the 
long-run equilibrium (Barro 1999). However, since there is general agreement that the 
essence of sustainability and the analysis thereof is generally thought to lie in a ‘treatment of 
the present and the future that places a positive value on the very long-run’ (Heal 1998) the 
choice of discount rate and/or the use of zero discount rates has remained a matter of great 
importance. As a result this choice has received much attention in the literature. 
 
This chapter is concerned with an alternative approach to discounting which is relevant to and 
has been extensively studied with regard to both CBA and models of optimal growth and 
sustainability. In addition to calls for once and for all reductions in or zero discount rates for 
the sake of intergenerational equity, environmental or other reasons, discount rates that 
decline with time, or Declining Discount Rates (DDRs) have arisen as an alternative way in 
which to incorporate these efficiency and equity goals. We now turn to these issues. 
 
 
3. Declining Discount Rates 
 
In this section we review the use of DDRs in the analysis of economic growth and 
sustainability and show how current work views the role of DDRs in considering 
intergenerational equity. This discussion concerns the utility discount rate ρ . We then go on 
to review the theoretical justifications that have emerged for the use of declining consumption 
rate of interest, δ , for CBA.  
 
3.1 Growth, Sustainable Resource Management, Intergenerational Equity and 
Declining Utility Discount Rates, ρ  
 
3.1.1 DDRs, Growth and Environment 
A number of authors have discussed the implications of DDRs for optimal and sustainable 
growth in the context of economic growth models. Important contributions in this area 
include Heal (1998), Barro (1999), Chichilnisky (1996) and Li and Löfgren (2000, 2001). In 
many of these cases the analysis is undertaken in the context of the stylised discounted 
utilitarian in which the objective is to maximise the inter-temporal sum of discounted utility. 
In this sense where DDRs are employed they refer to the pure rate of time preference, i.e. ρ , 
which in general will differ from the consumption rate of interest commonly used in CBA, δ , 
 described in Section 2. The motivation for the use of such DDRs comes from the empirical 
and experimental evidence that has been discussed at length in the ‘hyperbolic’ discounting 
as
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literature9. This is true of Li and Löfgren (2000, 2001) and Barro (1999) for example. The 
hyperbolic discounting literature provides empirical evidence suggesting that the discount 
rates that individuals actually apply vary and decline with the time horizon involved. For 
example, there is evidence to show that individuals discount the short run at rates up to 15% 
whilst the discount rate applied to the long-run falls to close to 2% for horizons beyond 100 
years (Lowenstein and Elster 1992). 
 
The implications for the utilitarian social planner’s decisions of employing DDRs have been 
addressed by several authors in different contexts. Perhaps the simplest analysis of these 
implications is the analysis of an economy dependent upon an exhaustible resource by Heal 
(1998, Ch 2). He develops a model of resource exploitation á la Hotelling (1931) and shows 
that if the social planner employs DDRs the path of consumption declines far slower than in 
the presence of conventional exponential discounting. Naturally, although consumption 
eventually falls to zero, the decline is much slower and so certain future generations enjoy 
higher levels of consumption. This illustrates one way in which intergenerational equity is 
partially addressed by DDRs: inequality increases at a slower rate here (Heal 1998).  
 
With regard to renewable resources it is a common result that, where utility depends upon the 
amenity value of environmental stocks, the optimal stationary solution as the discount rate 
goes to zero coincides with that of the so-called Green Golden Rule (GGR), a variant of 
Phelps’ golden rule in the context of environmental resources (Phelps 1961, Heal 1998, Li 
and Löfgren 2000). The GGR is an important concept in the analysis of sustainability and is 
characterised by the highest sustainable or long run level of utility. In this sense the GGR 
equilibrium treats each generation more equally and leads to a level of the resource stock that 
is higher than that under conventional utilitarianism10. Interestingly, Heal (1998) shows that a 
solution to the renewable resource problem involving the use of DDRs that are asymptotic to 
zero as  is asymptotically equivalent to the solution in the presence of zero discount 
rates, since the dynamical equations are asymptotically equivalent. That is, when DDRs are 
used the long run stationary solution tends towards the GGR. This represents a more concrete 
example of the relation between the use of DDRs and the concepts of sustainability and 
intergenerational equity. 
∞→t
 
Barro (1999) looked at the implications for the Ramsey model of using DDRs. Motivated by 
the work of Laibson he analysed what is widely recognised as a thorny problem in the 
application of DDRs, namely time inconsistency11. He showed that where there is non-
commitment, such that time inconsistent policies can be implemented, the optimal path might 
mimic that observed under conventional discounting. He concludes that the ‘introduction of 
variable rates of time preference leaves the basic properties of the Ramsey model intact’. 
However, Barro (1999) assumed that the discount rate declined asymptotically to some 
positive constant and was not interested in environmental sustainability.  
 
Li and Löfgren (2001) address this issue in the context of the Ramsey and Brock (Brock 
1977) growth models, the latter incorporates environmental quality into the Ramsey model. 
They also assume that the DDR declines asymptotically to zero. In comparing optimal growth 
paths for the discounted utilitarian for whom 0>ρ , zero discounting ( 0=ρ ) and for 
DDRs, they find that in the Ramsey model the stable arm of the saddle growth path of 
consumption under DDRs is bounded by those arising under utilitarianism and zero 
discounting. Specifically, the consumption path starts off in the region of the discounted path 
and converges in the long run to that of the zero discounting case. The stationary solution in 
the zero discounting Ramsey case is equivalent to Phelps (1961) golden rule where the capital 
stock is held at the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) stock. Just as in the renewable 
resource case with amenity value described above, the introduction of DDRs leads to a steady 
state at the golden rule level of utility and takes more consideration of long run 
sustainability12. However, where stock pollution is introduced in the Brock model, these 
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results do not hold in general, due mainly to the interaction of capital and pollution stocks, 
and it becomes unclear whether or not environmental quality increases or decreases when 
DDRs are employed.  
 
These are just some of the impacts that DDRs have upon the traditional analysis of optimal 
economic growth, environmental resource management and sustainability. In many cases the 
use of DDRs leads to optimal long run steady states which mimic the sustainable outcomes 
that arise under zero discounting: the GGR. However, it is widely thought that such outcomes 
place too much weight upon the far-distant future generations, at some considerable cost to 
the present or near future. Further contributions have attempted to move away from the pure 
utilitarian or sustainability maximands towards a more general formulation balancing the 
objectives of the present and the future more satisfactorily. In the examples that follow this 
balance is defined in terms of axioms of social/intergenerational choice. 
 
3.1.2 Intergenerational Equity vs Dictatorship 
Perhaps the most interesting contributions in this area are those which endeavour to tackle the 
issue of intergenerational equity axiomatically. Chichilnisky (1996) sets out a series of 
desirable axioms of sustainability and derives objective functions that adhere to them. Beyond 
this Heal (1995) and Li and Löfgren (2000) show the importance of using DDRs to solve 
renewable resource allocation problems that also adhere to these axioms. Perhaps the most 
important of these from the perspective of intergenerational equity is the axiom of non-
dictatorship, which states that there should neither be a dictatorship of the present over the 
future nor vice versa in evaluating long run economic growth. Chichilnisky (1996) notes that 
a utilitarian social planner who employs conventional discounting implies a dictatorship of 
the present over the future. That is, in such a representation there always exists a point in time 
at which the costs and benefits that accrue to the future generations do not enter into the 
calculus of the current utilitarian. In order to overcome the dictatorship of either generation 
over the other Chilchilnisky proposes an augmented objective function that explicitly 
incorporates, or is ‘sensitive’ to, the welfare of current and future generations.  Chichilnisky’s 
criterion is: 
 
(5)   ( )∫∞ ∞→−+Δ0, ),(lim)1(),(max tttttsc qcudttqcu αα
where utility (u) is a time invariant function of consumption (c) and the resource stock (q) at 
each time period (t) and  is the discount factor which could be the conventional 
exponential factor. Intuitively, the lim term reflects the sustainable utility level attained by a 
particular policy decision regarding ct and qt. This can be interpreted as the well being of 
generations in the far distant future and is the term that if maximized alone is associated with 
the GGR. Chichilnisky’s approach is therefore a mixture of the discounted utilitarian 
approach, allowing for DDRs or constant exponential discounting, and an approach that ranks 
paths of consumption and natural resource use according to their long-run characteristics, or 
sustainable utility levels. Notice that α∈(0,1), represents the weights the social planner 
applies to each of the components of the objective function, respectively current and future 
generations. Chichilnisky shows that the maximisation of (5) avoids the dictatorship of one 
generation over another. However, while Heal (1995) shows that the maximization of (5) in 
the presence of non-renewables does not exhaust the resource stock, leading to a positive 
long-run level of utility, the solution in the presence of renewable resources requires the use 
of DDRs. In the latter case however, the dictatorship axiom is violated: the present is 
implicitly a dictator over the future 
( )tΔ
13. 
In response to these issues, Li and Löfgren (2000) treat the future slightly differently.  They 
assume society consists of two individuals, a utilitarian and a conservationist, each of which 
makes decisions over the inter-temporal allocation of resources. However, the former 
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discounts the future at the constant rate 0>Uρ  and the latter discounts at the rate 0=Cρ . 
The utility functions of these two individuals are identical, and again have consumption (c), 
and the resource stock (q), as their arguments:  
 
(6)   
  
    
( ) dttqcuUUU tt )(),(1max 021 Δ=−+= ∫ ∞αα
∫ ∞ −= 01 )exp(),( dttqcuU Utt ρ
∫ ∞→ −= 002 )exp(),(lim dttqcuU Ctt ρδ
where  is the effective discount factor. The overall societal objective is to maximise a 
weighted sum of well-being for both members of the society, given their different respective 
weights upon future generations and subject to a renewable resource constraint. As in the case 
of Heal (1995), Li and Löfgren show that the use of a DDR which declines asymptotically to 
zero generates a solution to this problem where the DDR in this case is: 
( )tΔ
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){[ tt
t
ta UC ραρα −+−−−= expexp1ln1 }]  
For 0=Cρ  this gives a discount factor equal to ( ) ( ) ( )tt Uραα −+−=Δ exp1 , which has a 
minimum value of ( )α−1 , the weight attached to the conservationist or future generations. 
This ensuring that the effective discount rate declines to zero. Thus, unlike the utilitarian 
discount function, which tends to zero as time reaches towards infinity, the weighted discount 
function of Li and Löfgren’s model results in a positive welfare weight for the 
conservationist. For this reason there is no dictatorship of present over future generations. As 
the utilitarian’s welfare level is explicitly considered, neither will there be a dictatorship of 
the future over the present. Thus, the axiom of non-dictatorship is adhered to.  
Both Chichilnisky and Li and Löfgren show that a declining utility discount rate is consistent 
with non-dictatorship of one generation over another. In this way the ‘tyranny of the present 
over the future’ associated with constant rate discounting is overcome. However, whereas 
Chichilnisky allows the use of DDRs, the axioms of sustainability employed say nothing 
about the need for DDRs to generate sustainable and equitable solutions to resource allocation 
problems. Heal and Li and Löfgren show the importance of employing DDRs for this 
purpose, but only Li and Löfgren’s formulation achieves intergenerational equity in the sense 
of avoiding dictatorship. Perhaps equally important here is the fact that the dual objective 
function also provides clearer guidance as to the best path towards the sustainable solution, 
something that is absent from the definition of the GGR. One interpretation of this is that the 
absence of dictatorship also represents a reasonable efficiency equity trade-off. 
 
 
δ  3.2 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Declining Social Rate of Time Preference, 
 
3.2.1 Discount Rates Determined 
 
In our discussion of the determination of the correct discount rate for CBA above we have 
reviewed several arguments for once and for all reductions in the level of the discount rate in 
particular circumstances. Both Fisher and Krutilla (1975) and Weitzman (1994) provide 
separate rationales for a lower ‘environmental discount rate’ and although the arguments are 
not rooted in consideration of intergenerational equity per se, this lower discount rate would 
naturally place greater weight upon the far-distant future. However, as we have described 
above, such a reduction would still afford a dictatorship of the present over the future if the 
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discount rate remained positive. Perhaps for this reason the issue of DDRs for CBA has 
emerged, motivated less by the experimental evidence that has given rise to the notion of 
hyperbolic discounting, but more by the analysis of the socially efficient discount rate 
captured by the Ramsey equation, versions of which are seen in Equation (2) and  (3). 
 
Two important contributions in this area are those of Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2002a, 
2002b) each of which analyses the impact of uncertainty upon the determination of the social 
rate of time preference, δ , in a competitive economy. This is not to say that the issue of 
DDRs in a deterministic world has not been the subject of discussion. Weitzman (1994), for 
example, showed that the divergence between the social and private rates of return on capital, 
r and i respectively, is captured by the following equation: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
E
Zir 111  (8) 
 
here Z  represents the proportion of national income spent on environmental goods and w
projects (e.g. cleanups), whilst E  represents the elasticity of environmental improvement 
with respect to expenditure on environmental goods (e.g. preservation, mitigation), 
and 0>E . This reflects the tension in his model between investments in environmental 
protection and the production of consumption goods and the associated ‘environmental drag’: 
the fraction of extra consumption arising from a marginal investment that would have to be 
diverted to maintain the environmental standard. Notice that the social rate of discount, r, is 
lower than the private rate, i, for all positive levels of Z and E14. The important implication 
here is that the socially efficient discount rate will be declining over time if the proportion of 
income spent on environmental goods, E, is increasing over time. With positive growth this is 
guaranteed if environmental resources are luxury goods. A similar result holds if the elasticity 
of environmental improvement is declining over time. This analysis, summarised by equation 
(8), shows that even in a deterministic world consideration of preferences for the environment 
alone can provide an argument for DDRs15. 
 
3.2.1 Declining Discount Rates and Uncertainty 
learly, the one thing that can be said with certainty about the far-distant future is that future 
ncertain Marginal Productivity of Capital (r) and DDRs 
 an interesting paper, Weitzman (1998) develops ideas first formalised by Dybvig et al 
eitzman (1998) shows the relationship between the socially efficient discount rates and the 
time horizon when it is assumed that r is uncertain and agents are risk-neutral16. He shows 
 
C
states of the world are uncertain. Recent work by Weitzman (1998, 2001) and Gollier (2002a, 
2002b, 2002c) has investigated the impact of uncertainty upon the determination of the social 
discount rate for CBA and found that the arguments for DDRs are compelling. Their analysis 
of uncertainty concerning future states of the world, have focussed respectively upon the 
opportunity cost of capital, r, and growth, g. Furthermore, just as Weitzman (1994) 
introduced preferences for environmental goods as a determinant of the SDR in a structural 
model, Gollier (2002a, 2002b) shows that in an uncertain world it is preference for risk that 
becomes important. 
 
U
 
In
(1996) and shows how uncertainty regarding the marginal productivity of capital, r, leads to a 
DDR. He argues that there are good reasons to expect that in the long-run r is uncertain: there 
is uncertainty concerning capital accumulation, the degree of diminishing returns, the state of 
the environment, the state of international relations, and the level and pace of technological 
progress etc.  
 
W
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that, when these agents wish to maximise the NPV of investment either at an uncertain per-
period risk free interest rate, R~ , or in a project that yields a sure benefit in period T, the 
socially efficient discount rate (before the realisation of the uncertain risk free rate) is 
declining with time. In other words, the yield curve is declining. This result comes from the 
observation that we should average over discount factors rather than rates and discounted 
values are a convex function of the discount rate. In discrete time, recall that the discount 
factor for a time period t, ( tA ) is given by: 
 
t
t rrrr
A ++++= 1
1*......*
1
111
(9) *
1
*
1 321
     
 
With conventional discounting  When the social rate of return is uncertain however, rrt = .
mplici
there are several potential states of the world, each with an associated discount rate and 
probability of realisation. For si ty, imagine there are two potential future states of the 
world, state 1 and 2, each with an associated interest rate, 1R and 2R , and probability of being 
realised, 1p  and 2p , where 121 =+ pp . Assuming that R  and 2R  are constant across time 
in each scenario the associated discount factors for each sc ario a : 
 
1
en re
( )tt RA
1=  and, ( )tt RA
1=  
1
1 1+ 22 1+
 
In the face of uncertain r, agents are unsure as to how to evaluate the opportunity cost of the 
roject, and hence which discount factor to employ in determining the NPV. Agents must 
0) )  
Gollier (2002a) notes that, given the assumption of 
 the case that: 
p
make some judgement of the discount factor and will use the expected, or certainty equivalent 
discount factor. Weitzman defines the certainty equivalent discount factor for risk neutral 
agents as the expected value: 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( tttt RpRpRE −−− +++=+ 2211 11.~1(1     
risk neutrality, there would be arbitrage 
 
were it not
( )[ ] tttt rRE +=+(11) −−~ 1 11  
     
Where  is the equilibrium rate of interest for risk
  
tr -neutral agents prior to the realisation of 
R~ , and is defined by the point at which the expected cost of purchasing the claim of $1 at 
time t is equal to the present value of the benefit. Equation (11) shows that tr  is the 
ropriate socially efficient discount rate for use in CBA, and this is the certainty equivalent 
discount rate (CER)
app
17. It is easy to show that the CER is a declining function of time and a 
formal proof of this result can be sketched by noting that Equation (8) is simply a re-
statement of Jenson’s inequality: (1 + tr ) is an harmonic mean of ( )R~1+  over time, which is 
less than the arithmetic mean and tends to its lowest possible value, , as ∞→tminR 18. This 
is a well-known result which can be der ved from Pratt’s theorem (Gollier 2002c)i 19.  
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A numerical example is useful to see how these results are borne out. Table 1 assumes there 
able 1. Numerical Example of Weitzman’s Declining Certainty Equivalent Discount 
Interest Rate Discount Factors in Period t 
are 2 potential scenarios ( )2=j , the probabilities of which are distributed uniformly 
( 5.021 == pp ). 
 
T
Rate 
Scenarios 10 0 50050 100 20
2% ( p 5.01 = ) 0 0.82 .37 0.14 0.02 0.00
5% ( ) 5.02 =p 0.61 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
Certainty Equ t Discouivalen nt 
Factor, ( )[ ]tE −tR+ ~1  (7) 0.72 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.00  
Average   CER,  (8) 3.38% 2.99% 2.65% 2.35% 2.14% tr
Marginal CER, tr~   3.28% 2.57% 2.16% 2.01% 2.00%
 
The intuition behind this result is that calculating the CER rate requires taking a weighted 
eitzman’s argument seems very convincing: uncertainty in the discount rate itself leads to 
NPV vs ENFV 
he ENPV of a project that costs $1 today and yields $Z at time T when the 
average of several discount rate scenarios, where the weights are the discount factors. The 
discount factors in each scenario decrease exponentially over time in the way we observe 
when using conventional constant discount rates. In scenarios with higher discount rates, the 
discount factors decline more rapidly to zero. As such, the weight placed on scenarios with 
high discount rates itself declines with time, until the only relevant scenario is that with the 
lowest conceivable interest rate.  In effect, the power of exponential discounting reduces the 
importance of future scenarios with high discount rates to zero, since the discount factor in 
these scenarios goes to zero. Since in the ex ante equilibrium the certainty equivalent rate of 
discount must equal the socially efficient discount rate in all periods of time, this results in a 
SDR which declines over time. This behaviour is exhibited in Table: the CER approaches the 
lowest discount rate of the 2 scenarios considered, i.e. 2%. In year 200 the marginal CER has 
fallen to 2.01%, and by year 500 this rate has fallen 2.0%. 
 
W
an arbitrage in which the socially efficient discount rate is a declining function of time. In 
addition, the apparent ease of application renders it appealing to the practitioner. However, 
Gollier (2002c) argues that Weitzman's logic relies critically upon a tacit assumption that we 
are maximising the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) of a project such that the current 
generation that bears the risk of variation in the SDR. He illustrates this point by analysing the 
socially optimal discount rate that arises when we use an alternative criterion for project 
appraisal, the Expected Net Future Value (ENFV).  
 
E
In order to find t
discount rate, R~ , is uncertain the planner will evaluate: 
 
~
01: ≥+− − tRZEe  ENPV
 
 this condition holds, then the agent should proceed with the project. The certainty If
equivalent per period discount rate in this environment, ( )trw , is that which satisfies 
( )ttrtR weEe −− =~ , and this is declining over time as described ab  ove. 
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Alternatively, Gollier asks us to imagine that we want to maximise the ENFV, i.e. we wish to 
rank our projects on the basis of maximising the value of assets that accumulate to future 
generations. The ENFV rule can be thought of as: 
 
0:ENFV
~ ≥+− ZEe tx  
 
in which case the certainty equivalent per period interest rate, ( )tr  is that which satisfies 
( )ttrtx eEe =~ . Noting that ( ) ( )trtrw ≠ , Gollier suggests that, when we rank projects by 
ENFV the socially efficient discount rate, ( )tr  is in fact increasing over time, and converges 
to the highest possible value of r as ∞→t , the precise mirror image of Weitzman's (1998) 
result. Gollier argues that both of these criteria cannot be correct and that since the two only 
differ in the location of the residual risk: when we use ENPV, agents in the present are 
bearing the risk and under the ENFV it is the future generations that are bearing the risk, we 
need some method of choosing how to allocate risk in order to choose between them20. 
 
In many ways this seems like a bizarre result: the location of risk affects the decision of risk 
neutral agents. Indeed Hepburn and Groom (2004) show that this particular conundrum has an 
altogether different interpretation which has nothing to do with the location in time of risk. 
They show that ENPV and ENFV are special cases of a more general Expected Net Value 
(ENV) criterion which is dependent upon the base-year chosen for project evaluation. In this 
light they show that the certainty equivalent discount rate is increasing in the base-year 
chosen for CBA (the temporal numeraire) but decreasing with the passage of time in the 
manner of Weitzman (1998). This aside, as shown by equation (3), when we are considering 
uncertainty it is eminently sensible to understand the role of risk preferences; the extent of 
risk aversion, the level of prudence, in determining the discount rate. This is the approach 
taken by Gollier (2002a, 2002b). 
 
 
δ  The Effect of Uncertain Growth, g, on the Social Time Preference Rate, 
 
In the absence of currently existing financial markets which extend to the far-distant future, 
Gollier analyses the economic arguments for discounting the long run contained in δ . As 
described in (2) above there are two underlying characteristics of individual preferences 
which determine δ , i) pure impatience, represented by the utility discount rate, ρ , and ii) the 
desire to smooth growing wealth over time reflected by the term g.μ . Under certainty μ  
reflects the degree of aversion to fluctuations in consumption, however in the environment of 
uncertain growth that is the focus of Gollier, this term represents the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. This captures individuals' preferences for risk and how these preferences vary 
with income. The effect of individual preferences for risk upon the level of the discount rate 
has already been described: the wealth effect increases the discount rate and prudent 
individuals facing uncertain growth reduce the discount rate. These effects can be understood 
with reference to Equation (2) and (3) above. What is also clear from equation (3) is that 
changes over time in individuals’ preferences for risk  
 
Gollier analyses the yield curve in the context of a Lucas (1977) tree economy21. Simply put, 
Gollier (2002a, 2002b) shows that where growth is uncertain but definitely positive, that is 
there is no prospect of recession, and individuals exhibit Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion 
(DRRA) (μ  decreases with income), the socially efficient discount rate will also be 
decreasing over time. In other words as incomes grow over time the prudence effect 
outweighs the wealth effect and the yield curve is downward sloping. The corollary of this is 
that under the same conditions when individuals display Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
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(CRRA) μ  remains constant and the socially efficient discount rate remains flat: that is the 
prudence and wealth effects exactly compensate one another and the yield curve is flat.  
The complexity of the analysis is dependent upon the assumptions concerning the probability 
distribution of growth22. When the prospect of recession is introduced the conditions for a 
declining yield curve become highly specialised. For example, if there is a risk of recession in 
the long run, the yield curve is declining only if individuals display both DRRA and 
Increasing Absolute Prudence (IAP): ( ) 0' >cP 23. This represents a distinct class of utility 
functions with restrictions upon 4th derivatives. Furthermore, if the risk of recession is 
extended to all future periods, short-run and long run, a declining yield curve requires 
restrictions the 5th derivatives of the utility function. As Gollier himself states, there is little 
hope that such conditions can be tested in the near future. 
 
So, despite the apparent resolution that Gollier's provides in response to the conundrum 
arising from Weitzman's analysis regarding the intergenerational allocation of risk, the 
necessary conditions for DDRs to be theoretically justified become highly restrictive. This is 
particularly so when one makes realistic assumptions concerning the probability distribution 
of growth (that is, there is a positive probability of negative growth). Nevertheless, these 
conditions are testable in theory. 
 
 
3.2.3 Summary 
 
So far we have reviewed the current rationales for the use of DDRs in CBA and the effect that 
the use of DDRs will have upon models of economic growth and sustainability. We have 
found with regard to the second that the use of a utility discount rate ( ρ ) that declines over 
time is frequently justified by reference to the hyperbolic discount rate literature and can also 
result from objective functions that combine traditional utilitarian and objectives with those of 
a conservationist interested in long-term sustainability. We have also noted the 
correspondence of the steady state of some of these models with those employing zero 
discount rates. This has made clearer the relation between the justification for hyperbolic 
discounting from the perspective of experimental evidence and calls for the use of DDRs in 
order to address issues of sustainability and intergenerational equity. 
 
The use of DDRs in CBA has been advocated for similar reasons: the consideration of 
intergenerational equity and sustainability. However, in the case of CBA, where the discount 
rate employed is commonly the consumption rate of interest, δ , the theoretical justification 
for the use of DDRs has recently emerged from the analysis of economic behaviour under 
uncertainty. The theoretical contributions of Weitzman and Gollier appear to be compelling in 
this sense. 
 
For the practitioner however, one important question emerges from the theoretical literature: 
how are we to generate a schedule of workable DDRs for day to day use in the long-term 
policy arena? In the following section we provide a brief review of some of the approaches 
taken in this area. 
 
 
4. Determining a Schedule of Declining Discount Rates for CBA 
 
One of the practical steps involved in undertaking CBA is to determine the appropriate level 
of the discount rate. As described above, CBA\ usually uses units of consumption as the 
numeraire and thus the appropriate discount rate is the so-called consumption rate of interest 
or Social Rate of Time Preference, δ , which in a competitive economy is equal to the 
marginal opportunity cost of capital or risk free rate, r. For example, the UK Government 
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uses  δ = 3.5% as the discount rate for CBA where the decomposition is ρ = 1%, μ  = 1% 
and g = 2.5% (see, for example, Pearce and Ulph, 1999 for a discussion). Similarly, if the 
practitioner wishes to implement DDRs for CBA a methodology is required to determine the 
appropriate schedule over time based upon the theoretical contributions outlined above. 
  
The two most compelling arguments for declining δ  come from Weitzman and Gollier. The 
rationale for declining discount rates provided by Gollier (2002a, 2002b) is perhaps the most 
theoretically rigorous of these contributions. But determination of the trajectory requires very 
specific information concerning the preferences of current generations at the very least, and, 
in the long run, the preferences of future generations. (With the infinitely lived representative 
agent approach there is effectively only one agent, and thus one generation. The reference to 
current and future generations is therefore an intuitive interpretation of the long run). These 
parameters include the aversion to consumption fluctuations over time, the pure time 
preference rate, and the degree of relative risk aversion. For the case with zero recession, 
restrictions on the fourth and fifth derivatives of the utility function become necessary. In 
addition, the probability distribution of growth needs to be characterised in some way. 
Clearly, the informational requirements of the Gollier approach could be daunting. 
  
In order to implement the approach suggested by Weitzman (1998), it is necessary to 
characterise the uncertainty of the interest rate. In general terms this characterization amounts 
to defining a probability distribution for the future discount rate, and its behaviour over time. 
In this sense there are 2 ways in which we can interpret the example in Table 1 (Table on 
Numerical Example of Weitzman's Declining Certainty Equivalent Discount Rate). Firstly, it 
could represent the thought experiment of Weitzman (1998), in which we are currently 
uncertain about interest rates, and yet the interest rates will persist indefinitely ex post 
realisation. In this sense we have a probability distribution for the current uncertainty, which 
assumes that interest rates of 2 and 5% are equally likely, and we employ this distribution for 
all future periods. Uncertainty is therefore regarded as existing from day one, and all that is 
required is the current probability distribution of the discount rate. 
  
In a further article, Weitzman (2001) takes precisely this approach. In order to establish the 
probability distribution for the socially optimal discount rate he undertakes a survey of over 
2000 academic economists, and a so-called `blue ribbon' selection of 50, as to their opinion on 
the constant rate of discount to use for CBA. The responses were distributed with a gamma 
distribution with mean 4%, and standard deviation 3%, providing an ad hoc working 
assumption to determine the schedule of DDRs. The assumption implicit in the use of the 
gamma distribution is that there is uncertainty in the present about the interest rate in the 
future and that when uncertainty is resolved the realised interest rate will persist forever. 
  
Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P) take an alternative view. Rather than assuming uncertainty in 
the present, they state that we are currently fairly certain about the discount rate but 
uncertainty increases in the future. From this standpoint they characterise the uncertainty of 
the discount rate by econometric modelling of the time series process of interest rates. The 
estimated model is used to forecast future rates based upon their behaviour in the past. From 
these forecasts they derive numerical solutions for the CER. In doing so they are also able to 
provide a (weak) test of another assumption important to the Weitzman (1998) result, namely 
the presence of persistence of discount rates over time. They compare the discount rates 
modelled as a mean reversion process to a random walk model, and find support for the latter. 
The practical implications of implementing the declining discount rates that result are 
significant. When applied to global warming damages, the present value of damages from 
carbon emissions increases by 82%, compared with the same damages evaluated at the 
constant treasury rate of 4%. In monetary terms this translates into an increase in the benefits 
of carbon mitigation from $5.7/ton of carbon, to $10.4/ton of carbon. 
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Groom, Koundouri, Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2004) use US and UK interest rate data and 
by building on N&P's approach in determining DDRs, they make the following points 
concerning model selection and the use of DDRs in general. Firstly, N&Ps approach is 
predicated upon the assumption that the past is informative about the future and therefore 
characterizing uncertainty in the past can assist in forecasting the future and determining the 
path of CERs. If one subscribes to this view it is important to characterize the past as well as 
possible by correctly specifying the model of the time series process. This is particularly so 
when dealing with lengthy time horizons where the accuracy of forecasts is important. Indeed 
the selection of the econometric model is of considerable moment in operationalising a theory 
of DDRs that depends upon uncertainty, because econometric models contain different 
assumptions concerning the probability distribution of the object of interest. Groom, 
Koundouri, Panopoulou and Pantelidis shown for US and UK interest rate data that the 
econometric specification should allow the data generating process to change over time, and 
that State Space and Regime Switching econometric models (see Groom, Koundouri, 
Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2004) for the detailed description of the models) are likely to be 
appropriate. Secondly, selection between well specified models can and should be undertaken 
by reference to measures of efficiency such as coefficients of variation, confidence bounds 
and out-of-sample forecast MSEs.  
  
In conclusion, one could assert the path of the CER differs considerably from one model to 
another and therefore each places a different weight upon the future. The policy implications 
of these estimates is revealed in the estimation of the value of carbon emissions reduction, 
with values which are up to 150% higher than when using constant discount rates, and up to 
88% higher than the Random Walk model employed by N&P. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has reviewed the arguments for and the implications of employing Declining 
Discount Rates in CBA and in the analysis of economic growth and sustainability. The review 
shows that there are several growth models in which a relationship has been found between 
the long-run equilibrium under DDRs and that in which a zero discount rate is employed. This 
can have the effect of pushing the optimum under DDRs away from the conventional 
utilitarian outcome towards the Green Golden Rule level (GGR) of capital or environmental 
stocks. Furthermore, in response to worries that the GGR places weight on the future at too 
great an expense to the present, we highlight the result of Li and Lofgren (2000): DDRs can 
evoke a solution to resource management problems in which the objective function explicitly 
takes into account the preferences of present and future generations, such as those posited by. 
That is, the use of DDRs can balance the preferences of current and future generations such 
that neither are dictators over the other. This solution is not achieved by either zero or 
conventional discounting. It is in these senses that DDRs can be seen to encourage a more 
equal treatment of generations and promote sustainable outcomes. 
 
In the application of CBA, in which consumption is generally the numeraire, we have shown 
that there exists a body of theoretical work justifying the use of DDRs based upon the 
analysis of decisions under uncertainty. We have also discussed the implications a correctly 
specified model of discount rates, which provides a schedule of DDRs that values 
atmospheric carbon reduction 150% higher than conventional exponential discounting, and 
almost 90% higher than incorrectly specified models. In this sense sustainable outcomes are 
more likely to emerge from project appraisal with DDRs, but given that the theory of DDRs 
for CBA reviewed relates to the socially efficient discount rate, such outcomes can also be 
thought of as efficient. 
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1 Some authors have suggested that ρ  reflects impatience arising from the instantaneous risk, or 
hazard rate of death at a particular point in time. See for example Pearce and Ulph (1992) 
2 Following the definition of Kimball (1990) individuals are called  
3 
( )
( ) CCu
Cu
'
''−=μ ( )Cu, where  is the individual's utility function and ( ).'
( ).''u
u  is the first derivative of 
the utility function and  is the second and so on. 
4 With certain knowledge of each of the parameters on the RHS of (2) the level of the SDR is known 
with certainty. For example the UK Government employs δ as the test rate for project and policy 
appraisal. They assume that %1=ρ , 1=μ , and %5.2=g
0''' >
( )
, making the social time preference 
rate equal to 3.5% (HM Treasury, 2003). 
5 Precisely, individuals are defined as prudent where u . Noting that relative prudence is defined 
as C
u
uCP
''
'''−= 0'' <, and that u , where individuals are prudent ( ) 0>CP . 
6 If willingness to pay (WTP) for environment evolves at some pre-determined rate, say α , the 
rationale for this increase in WTP being that preferences for environmental resources are changing over 
time due to income growth or increased scarcity (Fisher and Krutilla, 1975), then WTP for a unit of 
environmental goods at time t can be written as: ( )tt WTP α+= 10 0
w
( )
WTP , where WTP  is willingness 
to pay at t = 0. In a deterministic world this means that we can derive an ‘environmental’ discount rate, 
, such that the present value of benefits (costs) that accrue at time t can be written as: 
twWTP +10 ( ), where ( )αα +−= 1/rw
w
, where r is the conventional discount rate and 
r > .  
7 See Pearce et al 2003, for a review. 
8 For example, if utility depends upon the amenity value of and environmental stock, q, as well as 
consumption then the relation between δ  and ρ  will reflect the changes in these stocks. The relation 
under certainty then becomes SSCCCC gg ,, μμρδ ++= , where the μ  terms represent the 
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption and q, and the g terms represent the growth of 
the consumption and q respectively. Note that in steady states 0== SC gg  and the two concepts 
coincide. 
9 Useful references in this area include Laibson (1997) Loewenstein (2000), Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992). 
10 Where both consumption and environmental stocks (amenity value) enter into the utility function this 
is achieved where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the stock are equal to the 
marginal rate of transformation of the stock of renewable resources. 
11 For more on the issue of time inconsistency see Heal (1998, CH7) and Pearce et al (2003) 
12 The MSY level of the capital stock reflects the point at which the marginal productivity of capital 
equals zero. Li and Löfgren (2001) assume that the production function is increasing up to this stock 
level and decreasing thereafter. 
 19
                                                                                                                                            
13 However, Dasgupta (2001) highlights a criticism (attributed to Kenneth Judd) of this approach on the 
basis that there is a way in which all generations can have their cake and eat it too.  Suppose the current 
generation devises a plan that maximizes only the integral part of the maximand in equation (12).  It 
simultaneously announces its intention to abandon that plan at some date in the distant future, at which 
point it will switch to a plan that then maximizes only the asymptotic part of the maximand.  The 
farther this switching date, the more nearly the integral part will be maximized.  But there will always 
be an infinite number of dates after the currently planned switching date, and hence it will always be 
possible to increase welfare by postponing the switching date. 
14 For a given level of Z, when the elasticity is low, and environmental expenditures are ineffective at 
cleaning up environmental damage, this divergence is increased. Weitzman’s interpretation, from the 
perspective of optimal growth, is that this is a signal that the economy is finding prior environmental 
damage difficult to undo, and one solution is to reduce growth (if this is a feasible policy option). 
Alternatively, where the elasticity is high, a better solution might be to increase environmental 
expenditures (Weitzman 1994). 
15 Other more ad hoc proposals for DDRs exist. Rabl (1996) for example suggests that utility should 
not be discounted in the long term, and hence not included in the calculation of the SDR for CBA, not 
because of the ‘ethical indefensibility’ suggested by Ramsey, but rather upon the inadequacy of 
financial markets in performing long-term redistribution of resources.  The implication here is that ρ  
represents the desire of the current generation to redistribute wealth, which is constrained by the time 
horizon covered by current financial markets, usually about 30 years.  His proposal implies a stepped 
schedule of discount rates for CBA, i.e. with ρ  set to zero after a period of 30 years or so. 
16 This is not crucial for this particular result to hold but is important for ease of exposition. The 
certainty equivalent could be defined to incorporate higher moments of the distribution of discount 
rates to reflect risk aversion, with a loss of tractability. 
17 It is important to note here that equation (8) reflects the discount rate that should be used to discount 
costs and benefits that occur at time t back to the present. However, Weitzman (1998) defines the CER 
as the rate of change of the certainty equivalent discount factor over time, thus his CER represents the 
period to period discount rate. The former can be thought of as the average CER, whilst the latter can 
be though of as the marginal CER. Weitzman shows that the marginal CER declines over time, whilst 
Gollier (2002a) shows how the average CER declines over time. 
18 It is worth noting once more the distinction between the average CER and the marginal CER. The discount rate 
discussed above, following Gollier (2002a), is the average CER.  It is the per- period discount rate that would need 
to apply over the entire time horizon under consideration to ensure there are no opportunities for costless arbitrage.  
In contrast, Weitzman (1998) discusses the marginal CER, defined in continuous time by 
t
t
t A
dtAd
~r
~
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than the solution to (6) above. Both the certainty equivalent average and marginal discount rates are declining over 
time in equilibrium; the marginal discount rate declines more rapidly.  However, Weitzman notes that at the limit, 
as , both are the same. 
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19 A rough sketch of the proof is as follows:  can be thought of as the certainty equivalent of a random pay-off, 
, for an agent with a constant degree of absolute risk aversion t.  As risk aversion increases, i.e. t increases, it is 
well known that the certainty equivalent  will decrease (Pratt 1964). Furthermore, as , r  will tend to 
the lower bound of ~ . 
20 Under ENPV after the realisation of the uncertain discount rate the NPV may or may not be positive, 
and since the payoff in the future is certain, any residual losses are borne by the present generation. 
However, when we use the ENFV criterion it is future generations that are bearing the risk. The present 
generation makes a certain contribution to the project, but the rate at which the fund accumulates, and 
hence the outcome in the future, is uncertain before the realisation of R~ . 
21 The Yield curve describes the term structure of financial assets. 
22 It is also dependent upon the inter-temporal relationships. For the purpose of the analysis Gollier 
(2002a) assumes that the growth shocks are independently and identically distributed. Although this is 
unrealistic, it avoids the complications associated with the analysis of serially correlated shocks. 
23 There are a number of additional necessary conditions for this to hold - for details see Gollier 
(2002b)). 
